In August 1917, the Ottoman administration reinforced the Ottoman armies in the region by incorporating German battalions and formed the Yıldırım Army Group. Erich von Falkenhayn, who had fought on the Western front, was appointed as its head. Many of our important commanders such as Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Fevzi Çakmak, İsmet İnönü, Refet Bele, Ali Fuat Cebesoy, and Fahrettin Altay were in the Palestine Front. Many units that had fought in Gallipoli were also on this front. There was no clear plan on the Turkish side, and even though months had passed since the end of the Second Battle of Gaza on April 20, 1917, discussions among the commanders continued, and no decision was made on the appropriate course of action. The superiority of the combat power had gradually shifted in favor of the British. By reinforcing their troops, the British had achieved a fourfold superiority on the Palestine front.
On the other hand, the Ottoman administration had not brought its units from the European front to the region, and had even shifted some of the units to Iraq, causing the weakening of the Ottoman army on the Palestine Front. Britain launched the Third Gaza Operation on November 2 while seeking to win the support of the Jewish lobby to secure more support from the United States, and issued the Balfour Declaration. A Jewish brigade had been sent first to Egypt and then to the Palestine Front to fight against the Turks alongside the British.
Von Kress Pasha, responsible for the Ottoman forces in the Gaza-Beersheba line, was primarily expecting an attack on Gaza. However, he would be mistaken. Compared to Gaza, the defense of Beersheba was weak. On October 10, the British intelligence dropped a bag containing special letters about the plans for the Gaza attack during reconnaissance near the Turkish lines, while escaping from Turkish patrols. On October 27, the ships belonging to the British and French navy and the artillery in front of Gaza started a very intense bombardment. The purpose of the intense bombardment of Gaza was not to damage the Turkish positions but to mask the movements of the units shifted to the front of Beersheba. The Beersheba garrison could not resist a force approximately 10 times larger than itself. While we were waiting for the attack in Gaza, the British had captured Beersheba on October 31, 1917. As the British gained a significant bridgehead, the Gaza-Beersheba line collapsed.
The attacks launched by the Ottoman forces to retake Beersheba did not yield any results. The British razed Gaza to the ground with intensive bombardment from both land and sea. Refet Bele Pasha preferred martyrdom to withdrawal. However, when there was no more means of defense, we withdrew from Gaza on the night of November 6-7, 1917. After the Third Battle of Gaza, where 4th Army Commander Cemal Pasha, who successfully defended Palestine in the First and Second Battles of Gaza, was relieved of his duty and the responsibility of the front was given to Marshal Falkenhayn, the newly established Yıldırım Army Group Commander, the British Army captured Beersheba and Gaza and helped open the Palestine Front along the coast and in Tel el-Sheria. Thus, the foresights of both Cemal Pasha and Mustafa Kemal Pasha regarding the German commanders were proven. The lack of a clear command structure among the Ottoman troops was one of the significant reasons for the loss of Gaza. The enemy had captured the Gaza-Beersheba line, thus opening the gateway to Palestine. The loss of Gaza would lead to the occupation of part of Jerusalem and Palestine by the British.
