Due to the cyber capabilities of the National Intelligence Organization (MIT), it became possible to monitor the extensive psychological warfare activities carried out by Israel, deploying dozens of influence agents and Israeli agents through social media platforms as part of the covert operations.
In covert operations, Mossad typically relies on local elements of the target country or foreign nationals residing in the target country for various reasons, rather than predominantly using its own agents and field operatives.
The latest major operation by the MIT targeting Israeli-origin espionage activities against Mossad has been outlined by the experts in three questions.
The National Intelligence Organization (MIT) had been enhancing its operational capabilities since the second half of the 2010s, leading to critical successes in a series of operations conducted both domestically and internationally. Especially in the period following the 2020s, within the framework of the operation chain targeting Mossad activities in Türkiye, many plans, spies, and informants were disclosed by MİT. In this context, as the 4th major link in the operational chain, a counter-intelligence operation was carried out by MİT on the eve of January 2024, once again dismantling Israeli-origin espionage activities and the recruitment spy network.
Following an extensive preparation period, in collaboration with the Counter-Terrorism (TEM) and Intelligence Branch Directorates, MIT organized a comprehensive operation on January 2, 2024, aiming to apprehend 46 individuals suspected of involvement in international espionage. Simultaneously conducted in a total of 8 provinces, including Istanbul as the central location, and others such as Ankara, Kocaeli, Hatay, Mersin, Izmir, Van, and Diyarbakir, the operations resulted in the arrest of 34 suspects. During the raids, €143,830, $23,680, various amounts of cash from other countries, an unlicensed firearm, numerous rounds of ammunition, and digital materials were seized.
It should be noted that, as part of the ongoing investigations led by the Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor's Office, substantial new information and evidence have been uncovered regarding Mossad's plans for "reconnaissance, tracking, assault, and abduction" through the use of foreign nationals residing in Türkiye as intermediaries.
The Israeli intelligence community comprises three main components: the Israeli internal intelligence agency (Shin Bet), Mossad, and Aman. While each of them has responsibilities for foreign operations, Mossad primarily holds the main responsibility for covert operations targeting rival and adversary states and non-state armed actors. However, Mossad often leverages local elements in the countries of interest or foreigners residing in the target country for its covert operations, rather than predominantly using its own agents and field operatives. Thus, Mossad empowers field operative directors and agents within its covert operations unit to handle the preparation, planning, execution, and management of operations, often delegating the implementation to the recruited spy network established in the target country.
As a result, many of the spies captured by MİT in these and previous operations are citizens of different countries such as Syria, Afghanistan, North Africa, Yemen, Iraq, and Palestine. Some of these individuals entered Türkiye following Israel's instructions, while others were recruited by Mossad after arriving in Türkiye for various reasons. It should be emphasized that these individuals working directly or indirectly for Mossad have diverse profiles, running a spy network ranging from refugees fleeing war to students seeking education. In this context, Israel has been noted for its elaborate planning, especially since October 7, targeting sensitive aspects of Turkish society. For instance, the insertion of various identities into society, such as a headscarved mother who has lost her children and spouse but remains unwavering in her beliefs or portraying many identities as distressed Palestinian women and men, specifically designed to exploit potential intelligence gaps swiftly and easily, aiming to lead Turkish society into a deep polarization spiral through disinformation, manipulation, theft, and extortion within certain political, ethnic, and religious groups. However, it should be emphasized that Israel's covert operational activities not only targeted Türkiye but also involved intensive efforts to identify and track Hamas members who entered Türkiye under various circumstances.
Therefore, Türkiye's operation against Mossad has two main objectives. Firstly, to expose and thwart all intelligence activities by Israel that directly or indirectly harm Türkiye's national interests. In this regard, it should be considered that MIT has undertaken preventive and proactive operational planning to avoid any intelligence failures. Secondly, to categorically prevent attempts to turn Turkish territory into an "action base" for intelligence wars between two different countries, as occurred, for example, between Israel and Iran.
Starting from the mid-2010s, corresponding to Hakan Fidan's presidency, the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) underwent a reform in its operational architecture to gain operational competence in line with the spirit and conditions of the time. A new model was adopted, focusing on enhancing capabilities and opportunities, ranging from human resources to the adaptation of advanced technologies. Consequently, MIT has achieved numerous successful operations, ranging from counterterrorism operations in different continents and regions to cross-border military operations. Simultaneously, MIT conducted many counterintelligence (CI) operations domestically, contributing to and supporting law enforcement and gendarmerie in their respective areas of operation, transforming collaborations into intelligence victories.
In this context, MIT's latest operation is significant not only for human intelligence but also for the knowledge and experience gained in the technical intelligence collection disciplines. Thanks to MIT's cyber capabilities, communication channels between Mossad operatives and dozens of impact agents deployed by Israel were identified. Additionally, the monitoring of psychological warfare activities carried out intensively through social media platforms by Israeli agents and recruited spy networks became possible.
Furthermore, it is important to note that MIT's CI activities were accompanied by proactive and effective intelligence diplomacy efforts. In this regard, the challenge in intelligence diplomacy became tangible when Shin Bet Chief Ronen Bar declared their intent to eliminate Hamas members in Qatar, Türkiye, and Lebanon, and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan responded by emphasizing the cost of such audacity. This exchange demonstrated that the challenge in intelligence diplomacy is not just rhetoric but has practical implications. The moment MIT's CI and Operations Directorates transformed into a more operative and effective structure, Turkish intelligence diplomacy began to have a result-oriented impact beyond political discourse.
